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1 Introduction
Many nations across the world are democracies, others are not, and these differences have
important implications for the welfare of their citizens both because of the value of democracy in
itself but also because of the potential economic implications that greater democracy has.1 The
variety of political systems we observe raises the question of why some countries are democratic
and others less so, and various candidate explanations have been proposed. Economists have
pointed out that the average level of education and income are deep causes of a country’s
level of democracy and tested this hypothesis using cross-country data, while political scientists
argue that democratic legitimacy2 is the key determinant of the level of democracy.3 The latter
literature has focused on the role played by individual political attitudes, and maintains that
the consolidation and stability of a democracy in a country is only possible if its citizens support
the democratic regime.4
A recent literature has thus emerged that measures the degree of support for democracy
and has found it to be strong in some countries but not in others. Explanations of these
differences have focused extensively on testing Lipset’s claim that education is a pre-condition for
democracy, and household survey data indicates that more educated individuals are more likely
to support democracy (see, for example, Bratton and Mattes 2005 and Evans and Rose 2007).
Amongst the many individual characteristics included, existing analyses control for gender and
find that in developing countries women tend to exhibit less support for democracy than men.
Surprisingly, this recurrent gender gap has received no attention in the literature. The aim of
this paper is to establish whether, in developing countries, there exists a gender gap in attitudes
towards democracy and to consider possible explanations.
There are reasons to believe that men and women have different political attitudes. Recently,
a substantial body of work has documented that the two sexes behave differently in politics,
as they vote differently and do not implement the same policies.5 It is then possible that the
1Sen (1999a) and Sen (1999b) discusses democracy as a universal value. The literature on whether democracy
is positively associated with per capita GDP levels and long-run growth has been the subject of substantial
controversy, although a number of recent works point towards a positive effect; seeAcemoglu et al. (2005),
Persson (2004), and Persson and Tabellini (2006), amongst others.
2According to Fails and Pierce (2010), the definition of legitimacy attitudes proposed by Lipset (1963) reflects
the “belief that the existing political institutions are the most appropriate ones for the society”.
3For the work of economists see, for example,Barro (1999), Acemoglu et al. (2008), while the approach proposed
by political scientists can be found in Diamond (1999) and Mattes and Bratton (2007).
4Diamond (1999), p. 168, reports that “stable democracy also requires a belief in the legitimacy of democracy”.
More recently Mattes and Bratton (2007), p. 193, maintain that “No matter how well or badly international aid
donors or academic think tanks rate the extent of democracy in a given country, this form of regime will only
consolidate if ordinary people believe that democracy is being supplied.”
5See for, example, Lott and Kenny (1999), Abrams and Settle (1999), Aidt and Dallal (2008), and Chattopad-
hyay and Duflo (2004) as well as our discussion below.
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two sexes also have different preferences towards democracy. The evidence for Sub-Saharan
Africa indicates that, on average, 73 percent of men believe that democracy is preferable to any
other kind of government, while only 65 percent of women agree with this statement.6 There
are several potential explanations for this 8 point gap. First, it could simply reflect different
attitudes towards democracy across genders that are embedded in the preferences of the two
sexes. The gap could also be due to the omission of relevant individual characteristics, such as
access to media, that are distributed differently across the two groups. Women’s lower support
for democracy may also be caused by differences in policy priorities across genders, with men
being more interested in the process through which decisions are taken and women in the actual
policy outcomes. Alternatively, the gap could be caused by the economic and institutional
context of the country, in line with the modernization hypothesis of Inglehart (1997) which
argues that a change in the economic and political environment reduces the differences in roles
between males and females and increases women’s interest in issues traditionally considered to
be the domain of men, such as politics. Distinguishing between these explanations is important if
we are to understand whether democratic support by women can be increased and if so through
which mechanism.
To conduct our analysis we use data from the Afrobarometer, a series of national surveys
on the attitudes of citizens towards democracy, markets, civil society, and other aspects of
development collected in African countries. Our variable of interest is support for democracy,
a dummy that equals one if the individual attests that democracy is the best political regime
and zero otherwise. We consider three sets of possible explanatory variables. The first is a
wide set of socioeconomic characteristics which prove significant but have a minor effect on the
coefficient on gender. In addition to the information on individual socioeconomic characteristics,
the survey asks individuals what are the policy priorities that they think the government should
tackle. We use this information to assess whether males and females have different priorities
and if this prioritization of government action leads them to express different degrees of support
for democracy. Although our data indicate than women are more concerned with social policies
and men with the political decision process, including the individual’s policy priorities in our
regressions for support for democracy has no impact on the coefficient on gender.
The evidence hence indicates a gender gap in support for democracy, and the last question
that we address is to what extent this gap is affected by the macroeconomic and institutional
context. We thus examine the effect of three sets of country-wide characteristics: the human
6See below for the details.
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development indicator (HDI), different measures of political institutions, and gender gaps in
various aspects of political and economic life. Although these variables prove insignificant for
the population as whole, we find that higher levels of both the HDI and political institutions
reduce the gender gap. Our results imply that in countries with sufficiently high levels of HDI
and/or institutions there is no difference between men and women in the degree of democratic
support, with the effect of gender being insignificant in between a quarter and half of the
countries in our sample depending on the specification. This evidence supports the view that
economic and institutional changes can change individuals’ views on democracy.
Our paper is related to two strands of literature. First, it contributes to a substantial body
of work addressing the determinants of support for democracy in developing countries using
survey data. This literature has largely focused on establishing the importance of education for
promoting democracy; see, for example, Mattes and Bratton (2001) and Bratton and Mattes
(2005) on Sub-Saharan Africa, and Shafiq (2010) on Lebanon, Jordan and Pakistan.7 Evans
and Rose (2007) emphasize the differential impact of various stages of education for political
attitudes. Their work on Malawi, as well as that of Mattes and Mughogho (2009) on all the
Afrobarometer countries, indicates that primary schooling is sufficient for the endorsement of
democracy and rejection of non-democratic regimes, with higher levels of education having a
limited impact.8 Survey data has also been used to examine the “democratic paradox of Islam”,
i.e. the fact that democracy is popular yet rare in Muslim-majority countries; see Rowley and
Smith (2009). Maseland and van Hoorn (2011) maintain that the positive attitudes towards
democracy of citizens in Muslim countries should not be explained by religion but rather by
decreasing marginal utility. The scarcity of democracy -which tends to be a feature of Muslim-
majority countries- implies that residents in those countries value it more than those from
countries where the supply of democracy is larger.
In all of the above analyses -with the exception of Shafiq (2010)- the significant coefficient
on gender indicates that women are less supportive of democracy than men, yet the reasons for
this gap have not been examined. Closely related to our work is Coffe and Bolzendahl (2011)
who examine gender gaps in political participation in Sub-Saharan Africa. As is the case in
Western countries (e.g., Burns 2007) there is a substantial difference in the degree of political
participation of men and women. However, Coffe and Bolzendahl show that the individual
socioeconomic characteristics that have been found to be important in explaining this gap in
7See, for example, Bratton and Mattes (2005) and Mattes and Bratton (2001).
8Despite a strong effect of education on political preferences, its impact on political participation is less clear;
see Mattes and Mughogho (2009).
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Western countries do not reduce significantly the gap in Sub-Saharan Africa. They postulate
that institutions are important and find a negative correlation between a country’s gender gap
in participation and the quality of its political institutions. These results indicate that the
institutional framework could be an important determinant of differences across genders in
support for democracy too. Our approach differs from that of Coffe and Bolzendahl (2011)
methodologically since we include institutions in the individual regressions rather than looking
at cross-country correlations with average gender gaps. This allows us to examine the magnitude
of the effect of institutions as compared to that of individual characteristics.9
Our work is also related to the influential literature on the differences between men and
women in political preferences and behaviour, which we discuss in detail in the next section.
Our paper differs from this literature in two aspects. First, existing work has focused on the
effect of differences in policy preferences across genders either on voting or on government
expenditure. We examine whether differences in preferences can explain the gender gap in
support for democracy, a question so far not addressed by the literature. Second, previous
analyses have used data for either Western countries or India, all of which are established
democracies. In contrast, we focus on sub-Saharan Africa, a region in which democracy is a
relatively new concept. There is, to the best of our knowledge, no previous analysis of the
political attitudes of women in this part of the world, whether in order to understand gender
differences in policy priorities or the consequences of the latter.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follow. We start by a discussion of the relationship
between gender and politics that reviews the existing literature and postulates our hypotheses
about the gender gap in political participation. Section 3 describes the data, while section 3
sets up the empirical model. In section 4 we discuss the results, testing whether the gender gap
holds for our data before moving onto the central analysis of the paper. Some robustness checks
are reported in section 5, while the last section concludes.
2 Political attitudes and gender
2.1 Related literature
It is well established that men and women vote differently, with women tending to support more
left-wing parties; see Langer (1996). Over the past decade and following the seminal work of Lott
and Kenny (1999) and Aidt and Dallal (2008), economists have started examining the causes of
9In fact, as we will see below, one of the advantages of our approach is that by including country-level measures
of institutions in regressions on individual data we can examine whether or not good institutions can erode the
impact of gender differences. This cannot be done when regressing national average gaps on country features.
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differences in political attitudes of men and women and their impact on economic policy. Three
reasons have been put forward as explanations of gender differences in preferences for parties and
policies: women’s greater risk aversion and the consequent desire for insurance; women’s lower
incomes or expected incomes, for example following a prospective divorce, leading to support
for redistribution; and a preference for social expenditures such as basic infrastructure (e.g.
water supplies), health and education that impact the production of household goods, including
children, on which women tend to specialize; see Lott and Kenny (1999) and Chattopadhyay
and Duflo (2004). The evidence indicates that the effect of women’s entry into the political
arena, either as voters or as policy-makers has been substantial. Lott and Kenny (1999) use
cross-sectional data for US states over the period between 1870 and 1940 to examine the impact
of female suffrage on the size of public expenditure and, in particular, on social spending. Their
results indicate that women’s vote resulted in both larger government and increased social
spending, a result also found in Western European countries where government spending moved
away from “guns” and into “butter”; see Aidt and Dallal (2008).
Following this literature two different questions have been addressed by recent work. The
first one tries to establish whether differences such as those found in voting behavior also ap-
pear when women are policy-makers. Work on both rich and developing countries indicates
that this is indeed the case. Evidence for India shows that the type of public goods provided
depends strongly on the gender of the local political leader, with female leaders investing more
in goods linked to their own concerns, such as drinking water, and spending more in public
health provision; see Chattopadhyay and Duflo (2004), Clots-Figueras (2011) and Bhalotra and
Clots-Figueras (2011). In the case of rich countries, where the distinction between ’women ori-
ented’ and ’male oriented’ public goods is less clear, the evidence has concentrated on social
spending, and recent work on Switzerland by Funk and Gathmann (2010) indicates that female
policy-makers affect the composition of public spending, tending to increase spending on public
health and social welfare.
A complementary literature has seek to understand and test the causes of these differences
across genders. Edlund and Pande (2002) and Edlund et al. (2005) focus on the role of marriage
patterns. The last three decades of the 20th century have witnessed a decline in marriage,
whether because of divorce (the most prevalent cause in the US) or due to the possibility of
forming other types of unions (a pattern common in much of Western Europe). These changes
have made men richer while women have become poorer and face greater income uncertainty.
Economic theory then implies that the latter will demand greater income redistribution and more
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family-oriented social spending, and this could have been the cause of the observed changes in
public expenditure. In contrast, Cavalcanti and Tavares (2011) argue that higher government
spending reduces the cost of housework, with child-care being the most obvious example. This
implies that the opening of labour markets to female employment that occurred in the mid-20th
century also increased the demand for social spending. Both hypotheses seem to be supported by
the data, either in a cross section of countries or at the individual level, with Edlund and Pande
(2002) finding that following divorce women become more left-wing. Such evidence indicates
that the socioeconomic environment in which women live can affect the gap in their policy
preferences relative to those of men. Among the various differences between women and men
in the political arena, the work on corruption and gender has highlighted that females are less
likely to be involved in corruption and in bribes and that increasing the share of females in the
political arena and, more generally, social equality between men and women reduces the degree
of corruption; see Swamy et al. (2001), Swamy et al. (2001) and Branisa et al. (2009).
Concerning, the gender gap in support for democracy, the evidence indicates that it is present
in regions other than Sub-Saharan Africa. Rowley and Smith (2009) and Maseland and van
Hoorn (2011) use the World Survey Values (WSV) for countries from different regions to test
whether citizens from Muslim majority countries are less democratic than others. Among the
different controls, they include gender and the resulting coefficient indicates that women are
less democratic than men. Waldrom-Moore (1999) explores the origins of mass support for
democracy using the Central and Eastern surveys from the Eurobarometer. The evidence for
Hungary, Czechoslovakia, Poland, Russia, Ukraine and Lithuania implies that women in these
countries tend to be less democratic. This result is consistent with the view that Eastern
European women accept traditional roles, prefer the order and security of authoritarian rule
and are less willing to accept plurality; see Bahry (1987), Carnaghan and Bahry (1990)). The
only exception seems to be Shafiq (2010) who does not find a gender gap in support for democracy
when looking at Indonesia, Jordan, Lebanon, Pakistan and Turkey.
2.2 Hypotheses
The literature we have just discussed indicates that men and women have different policy pref-
erences and that gender can have a substantial effect on policy outcomes. With its focus on
democratic countries, it highlights that female votes and female politicians result in different
levels and composition of public expenditures than those that would have prevailed if only men
had participated in the political process. The question we pose goes back one step and asks
whether men and women also differ in their attitudes towards democracy.
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There are various reasons why reported attitudes towards democracy may differ across gen-
ders. The first is simply that men and women have different intrinsic preferences concerning
democracy, just in the same way as women tend to be more risk-averse; see, for example,
Brachinger et al. (1999). A second possibility is that existing work has failed to include all
the relevant individual characteristics that determine democratic support. Three aspects come
to mind. The first is the difference across genders in access to media. Much media access in
developing countries does not occur in the home but in communal places, such as bars or coffee
houses, that women are less likely to visit. As a result, their access to information may be more
limited and lead to lower democratic support. A second aspect that may affect political atti-
tudes is the experience of corruption. Encounters with corrupt officials and bureaucrats could
reduce faith in the political system and undermine support for democracy. If women tend to
have more experience of these encounters, for example because they deal with these bureaucrats
while running the household (i.e. establishing access to utilities, seeking medical treatment, or
ensuring children’s education), then these experiences will affect their political attitudes. We
are also interested in the environment in which the interview took place, since the presence of
children or a male relative and the need to conform to traditional female roles in front of them
could affect females’ responses.
A third hypothesis is that responses to the question concerning support for democracy reflect
different policy priorities across genders. As we will see below, when asked about the priorities
that the government should tackle, men and women give different responses. Men are more
interested in politics and war, including issues like political rights and violence, while women
are mainly concerned with social policies such as health, education and food shortages. It is
then possible that women see the type of political regime as being of secondary concern relative
to social policies and hence show less support for democracy.
Lastly, we will examine whether the country’s economic and institutional environment affects
gender differences in democratic support by considering the effect of three sets of country-wide
characteristics: the human development indicator (HDI), political institutions, and gender gaps
in education and policy-making. There are various reasons why development, good institutions
and gender equality may affect political attitudes. The modernization hypothesis proposed by
Inglehart (1997) and further developed by Inglehart and Norris (2003) argues that changes in
the economic and political environment tend to be followed by a decrease in the differences in
gender roles, and this will in turn impact the political climate. In the context of our analysis, it is
conceivable that traditional gender attitudes see only men as entitled to have political opinions,
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implying that women would not have a view on the desirability or not of democratization. In
countries where gender differences are strong this would lead to systematic differences in support
for democracy across genders, which would be absent in more gender-egalitarian societies.
There is a second reason why the institutional context may matter. Recent evidence on
democratization and economic development has shown that many transitions to democracy are
violent and create substantial civil conflict, and this has been particularly so in Africa. Moreover,
empirical work on the effect of democratization on output and growth rates shows that the short-
run effect of democratization is positive when the process is peaceful but not when it is violent.10
In this context it is possible that the different responses of men and women are related to the
cost of democratization, which may be higher for women. The cost of conflict may be higher for
women for reasons going from the cost of fleeing conflict areas and relocating to that of female-
specific violence such as rape. Even in less extreme situations, women may expect to bear a
higher cost of conflict since it will lead to an increase in military expenditure and a reduction
in welfare spending, which as has been shown by the literature reviewed above, they value
more than men. When institutions are weak and the level of development low, democratization
is more likely to be accompanied by conflict, and the internalization of such costs may make
women more cautious about supporting democracy than men. In contrast, in a more favorable
economic and institutional climate the transition to democracy is more likely to be peaceful,
thus reducing the gender gap in democratic support.
Our empirical analysis hence proceeds in three steps. We first consider the effect of additional
socioeconomic characteristics on the gender gap in support for democracy. We next examine
differences across genders in policy preferences and see whether they help us understand the
gap in democratic support. Lastly, we test whether the country’s economic and institutional
environment has an effect on the gap.
3 Data and descriptive statistics
3.1 The Afrobarometer survey
We use the latest data from the Afrobarometer, round 4, which contains surveys that took
place in 20 countries between March 2008 and June 2009. In total 27,713 individuals aged
between 18 and 64 years were interviewed. The countries that took part in the survey are Benin,
Botswana, Burkina Faso, Cape Verde, Ghana, Kenya, Lesotho, Liberia, Madagascar, Malawi,
Mali, Mozambique, Namibia, Nigeria, Senegal, South Africa, Tanzania, Uganda, Zambia and
10See Cervellati and Sunde (2011), Cervellati and Sunde (2012) and Nannicini and Ricciuti (2010).
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Zimbabwe. The data was collected through face-to-face interviews with questions posed in the
local language. National probability sampling is applied in order to generate a sample that is
a representative cross-section of all citizens of voting age in a given country. For instance the
method of random selection is used at each stage of the sample.11 Table 1 reports the descriptive
statistics of the core variables that we use in this paper.
Our main dependent variable is support for democracy. We construct it from the answers
to question Q89 of the survey which asks: Which of these three statements is closest to your
opinion? The possible answers are: (1) Democracy is preferable to any other kind of government;
(2) In some circumstances, a non-democratic government can be preferable; (3) For some like
me, it does not matter what kind of government we have, and (4) I don’t know. As has been
done in previous work, we create a binary variable (democracy), which takes a value of 1 if the
respondent thinks that a democratic system is preferable to any kind of political system, and
0 otherwise. 12 The data indicates strong support for democracy, with 70% of the population
giving the first answer. The remaining 30% of respondents are roughly equally divided into
the three other possible answers. The fraction of respondents saying that they don’t know is
substantial (8%), and in the robustness section we will examine whether our results are affected
by their exclusion.
Our key explanatory variable is gender which takes a value of 1 for females and 0 for males.
The data is such that 50.01% of the interviewees are males and 49.99% are females. Figure 1
depicts preferences for democracy for the two sexes. A majority of both men and women support
democracy, but the figure is almost 8 percentage points higher for males, with only 65.81% of
women saying that democracy is always preferable as compared to 73.55% of men. For the other
three replies, the frequency is higher for women, although in the case of “in some circumstances,
a non-democratic government can be preferable ”the difference is not statistically different across
genders.13.
We include standard individual socioeconomic characteristics that have been used in pre-
vious work, namely education, age, place of residence, and employment status. Education is
divided into 5 categories: no-formal schooling concerning 20% of the population, incomplete
primary school (18%), completed primary (35%), completed secondary (15%), and completed
11For more details about the survey method and questionaires readers are invited to refer to the manual of the
Afrobarometer. For details on sampling methods, readers are invited to consult the section Survey and Methods
of the Afrobarometer available at http://www.afrobarometer.org/survey-and-methods/sampling-principles.
12When we talk about support for democracy we refer to the reply that without any doubt democracy is the
best political regime.
13The standard error of the difference of frequency across genders is 0.558 for the reply “Democracy is preferable
to any king of government. ”, 0.383 for “In some circumstances, a non-democratic government can be preferable
”, 0.389 for “It does not matter what kind of government we have”and 0.322 for “I don’t know ”
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post-secondary (11%). The overall level of education is hence very low, with only 74 percent
of the population having at best completed primary education.14 The three age categories are
18 to 25 year olds, those between 26 and 35, and those above 35. For the place of residence we
have people living in rural areas (62%) versus urban areas (38%). The employment status has
three categories: employed, unemployed and inactive.
We also consider access to media and experience of corruption. To measure access to media
we consider separately the access to news from radio,TV and newspapers. For each of them the
variable is a dummy which is equal to 0 if the individual attests never having access to media
from that given source, and 1 otherwise. In the sample 87% of the population has access to
news from radio, 54% from TV and 41% from newspapers. For the perception of corruption
we code 0 for people who have never been in a situation in which they had to pay a bribe,
provide a gift or do a favor to officials in exchange for a document or permit, and 1 otherwise.
A relatively small fraction of the population, 21%, reply that they have experienced corruption.
Because democracy can be linked to views on the current government, we measure perceptions
about the government. We use the question “how well or badly would you say the current
government is handling the following matters, or haven’t you heard enough to say: managing
the economy, narrowing gaps between rich and poor”. We code manage1 (gappoor1 ) as one if
the answer concerning managing the economy (narrowing gaps) is ‘fairly well’ or ‘very well’,
while manage2 (gappoor2 ) takes the value of 1 if the individual answers that s/he does not
have enough information. The reference group are thus those who answer ‘very badly’ or ‘fairly
badly’.
As we have argued above, in traditional societies the replies of women may be influenced
by the presence of a male during the interview. We hence consider variables that inform us
about the environment through which the interview took place and which are recorded by the
interviewer at the end of each interview. We create the variable presence that tells us whether
someone (spouse, children or others) was present during the interview. The variable check
equals 0 if the interviewee did not check his/her replies with anybody during the interview and
1 otherwise. The last two variables that we use are a dummy influence which is equal to 1 if the
interviewer thinks that the individual is influenced by someone present and a dummy approach
which equals 1 if any representative of community associations or political parties approached
the interviewee during the interview.
14These are the categories reported in the questionnaire, and hence we do not have information on, for example,
those who have had some secondary education but not completed it.
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3.2 Measuring policy priorities
To shed light on the link between the differences in policy priorities between men and women
and their impact on the gender gap on support for democracy we exploit the question Q56pt in
the survey which asks: ”In your opinion, what should be the most important problems facing this
country that the government should address?” Each respondent can give up to three problems
or say that there are no problems. A total of 36 problems are listed, which we then group into
5 categories; (1) Macro, (2) Social-discrimination, (3) Politics-war, (4) Infrastructure, and (5)
Agriculture. We also create the category (6) Nothing which contains people who think that there
are no problems. A description of the components for each of the first five categories is given in
table 2 in the appendix. Examples of the items included in these categories are concerns over the
management of the economy, unemployment and wages for macro; food shortages, education,
health and women’s rights for the second category; political rights and wars for the third; roads,
electricity and water supplies for infrastructure; and farming policy and droughts for agriculture.
The fact that each respondent can give up to three concerns raises the issue of how to
attribute policy priorities to individuals. We have used two different approaches. The first
strategy, termed priorities 1, is to create for each priority a dummy equal to 1 if at least two out
of the three problems given by an individual fall in that category and 0 otherwise. Consequently,
for each individual in the survey there will be a one in a given policy priority and zero in all
the others, implying that we will attribute a unique policy priority to each respondent. When
using this strategy there will be a 7th category, termed else, that includes individuals who either
report only one problem or report at least two but all in different categories. Our second strategy,
priorities 2, consists of coding a category as 1 if the individual gave at least one concern in that
category. Individuals can hence have two or three policy priorities at the same time.
Figure 2 shows the proportions of individuals that hold each policy priority. The top graph
reports priorities 1 and shows that 43.3% of the population have not given two problems in
the same category of policy priorities. The bottom panel reports priorities 2, which, given our
definition cannot add up to 100%. Obviously for any given category of policy the proportions
are higher in the second graph than in the first one. For instance the percentage of individuals
that have at least two concerns classified in the category Politics-War is 2.65%, but this value
raises to 23.86% once we adopt the second codification.
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3.3 Measuring the economic and institutional context
To control for the context in which the individual lives we use the Human Development Index
(HDI ), the percentage of seats held by women in the national assembly (Nationalseats) and
the adult literacy gap between males and females (GAP). All of these measures come from
the UNDP and the descriptive statistics are reported in table 3 in the appendix. We measure
political institutions by the index of democracy (DEM ) from Polity V, as well as the indices of
political rights (PR) and of civil liberties (CL) from the Freedomhouse data. For all of these
different measures we use the value for 2008, which coincides with the earliest year of interview
in the surveys.
The HDI index measures development by combining indicators of life expectancy, educational
attainment and income. It ranges between 0 for the lowest development level and 1 for full
development. The average cross-country value of HDI is 0.454 with a standard deviation of
0.096. Mozambique records the lowest HDI index, 0.304, and Botswana has the highest value,
0.624. Despite widespread use, a major limitation of the HDI has received is that it does not
account for distributional aspects, either across households or across genders.15 Because of this
and given our interest in disparities across the sexes, we consider the two measures of gender
gaps. On average, the percentage of seats held by women in parliament is 18.6%, with Nigeria
exhibiting the lowest and Mozambique the highest values. To compute the adult literacy gap
we divide the literacy rate of females aged over 15 by the literacy rate of males aged over 15,
which yields an average literacy gap of 0.812.
The index of democracy takes into account the competitiveness of executive recruitment,
the openness of executive recruitment, constraints on the executive, and competitiveness of
political participation. It ranges between 0 and 10, with a value of 0 denoting a full autocracy
and a value of 10 a full democracy. On average the level of democracy across countries in the
sample is 5.786 (standard deviation of 2.719). The only full democracy in the data is Cape
Verde, and Uganda has the lowest value, 1. The political rights index reflects freedom in the
political process, including the right to vote freely, compete for public office, join political parties
and organizations, and elect representatives. The index of civil liberties measures freedom of
belief and of association and assembly, the protection from physical abuse and from state terror,
including rights of ethnic and religions, and gender equity. In the original data both indexes, PR
and CL, range between 1 and 7, with a lower value indicating higher quality of institutions. We
have recorded them in an ascending order so that higher values reflect better institutions. The
15See, Harttgen and Klasen (2012) as well as Klasen and Schu¨ler (2011).
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average value for the PR index is 4.824 with the minimum and maximum being, respectively, the
values for Zimbabwe and Cape Verde/Ghana. Zimbabwe and Cape Verde are also the countries
with the lowest and highest values of the CL index.16
4 Empirical Strategy
We denote by pij = Prob(democracyij = 1) the probability that individual i living in country
j prefers a democratic regime to any alternative. In a logistic model this probability can be
expressed as follows:
pij =
exp(zij)
1 + exp(zij)
(1)
where
zij = α0 + α1genderij + α2Xij + ǫij (2)
The vector Xij contains the socioeconomic characteristics of individual i in country j. Our
parameter of interest is α1 which measures the impact of gender on the probability to sup-
port democracy. A negative sign means that being female decreases the probability to support
democracy compared to being male, and we are interested in whether after the inclusion of
additional explanatory variables this coefficient remains significant.
It is likely that individual error terms are not independent within countries thus standard
errors may be underestimated with traditional regression techniques. We use multilevel modeling
in order to takes such clustering into account. By allowing the intercept α0 to vary across
countries, we can write the following two-level equation system:
Level 1: zij = α0j + α1genderij + α2Xij + ǫij , εij ∼ N(0, σ
2),
Level 2: α0j = α00 + uj , uj ∼ N(0, γ
2), εij⊥uj
(3)
and combining level 1 and level 2 we obtain
zij = α00 + α1genderij + α2Xij + uj + ǫij (4)
The term uj + ǫij in equation 4 represents the random part of the model where uj is the
country-specific effect and ǫij is the individual-level error term. To measure the correlation
between individuals that share the same country we use a measure of intraclass correlation,
which indicates the proportion of the variance that is explained by the clustering structure. The
16Some countries have surprisingly low levels of democracy (example of Uganda) and this is partly due to the
fact that we are using a single year, 2008.
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formula for the interclass correlation ρ is given by
ρ =
γ2
γ2 + σ2
(5)
The parameter σ2 is the variance of the error term uj and by convention in a multilevel logit
model the parameter γ2 is supposed to be equal to π2/3 where π is the mathematical constant;
see (Hox 2010).
One of the questions that we want to address is to which extent the gender gap in priorities
explains the gender gap in support for democracy. In order to do so, we need to first examine
whether there is a gender gap in policy preferences. We hence define φkij as the probability that
individual i in country j has the policy priority k. This probability will be estimated using the
following specification:
φkij =
exp(θij)
1 + exp(θij)
(6)
θij = β00 + β1genderij + β2Xij + ηj + νij , ηj⊥νij (7)
The specification of equation 4 including policy priorities is thus given by
zij = α00 + α1genderij + α2Xij +
K∑
k=1
αk3priority
k
ij + uj + ǫij (8)
where K is the number of policy priorities and prioritykij is a dummy that equals 1 if the
individual has the policy priority k and zero otherwise.
We are also interested in whether the gender gap in support for democracy depends on
cross-national differences in the economic and institutional environment. We will do so by
incorporating a vector of aggregate variables Yj as well as a term interacting these variables
with gender. Our specification then takes the form
zij = α00 + α01Yj + α1genderij + α11Yj ∗ genderij + α2Xij +
K∑
k=1
αk3priority
k
ij + uj + ǫij (9)
The parameter α1 reflects the direct impact of gender on the probability to support democracy
while α11 tells us the degree at which the impact of gender on the probability to support
democracy depends on country features such as the level of development and the quality of
institutions. A positive and significant α11 means that the higher the level of development
and/or institutions in a given country, the smaller the gender gap in support for democracy is,
with the total effect of being female given by the term α1 + α11Yj , which obviously is country
specific.
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5 Results
5.1 Support for democracy
We start by reporting in table 2 the coefficients obtained when we regress the probability to
support democracy on a standard set of individual variables. The first column reports the re-
gression where gender is the only covariate and we add sequentially additional socioeconomic
characteristics. The estimated value of the intraclass correlation is 0.088, indicating that roughly
8.8% of the variance is explained by country specificity. Column [3] mimics the standard regres-
sion run by much of the literature, with education having a positive and significant effect, and
older individuals and urban residents being more likely to support democracy. The coefficient
on gender is statistically and economically significant, and being a man increases support for
democracy as much as the difference between having had some primary education and having
completed it (the effect is given by the differences between the coefficients on educ2 and educ1 ).
Columns [4] to [6] include, sequentially, access to media, experience of corruption, dummies
for the presence of someone else during the interview, and the individual’s views on how the
government is dealing with poverty and the economy. Most of these variables are significant and
although they reduce slightly the impact of gender, its coefficient remains large and statistically
significant.
Turning now to the other individual characteristics included in the regression, we find that
as well as education, age plays an important role in explaining democratic support with young
people supporting democracy less than their elders. Youth represents an important fraction of
the population in Sub-Saharan Africa, and in our sample 57% of individuals are between 18 and
35 years old. Little attention has been given to explaining the behavior of Africa’s youth in
politics, with the exception of Resnick and Casale (2011) who find that youth in Sub-Saharan
Africa vote less and are less partisan that their elders. Urban residents are more supportive of
democracy than those from rural areas, but once we control for access to media the coefficient
on urban becomes significant only at the 10% level. We do not find a significant difference
between employed and unemployed individuals, but we find that those who are inactive are
less democratic. The results also show that media access plays an important role, with those
getting news from the radio and from newspapers being more democratic than people who do
not have access to media from any source. TV access has only a weakly significant coefficient,
as aspect that may be due to the fact that it is more likely to be government-controlled than
other sources of information. In addition, individuals who have experienced corruption favor
democracy less than those who have never experienced corruption, suggesting that corruption
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hinders democratic support.
In column [5] we control for the environment in which the interview took place through
variables reported by the interviewer at the end of each meeting. Results show that the presence
of someone has a negative impact on support for democracy but this impact is significant only for
presence3. Surprisingly this indicates that having children present during the interview reduces
the probability of supporting democracy but having the spouse present does not. A possible
explanation is that those who have young children -for whom it is more likely that children are
present- are more interested in social policies and less in the political decision making process.
Also respondents who have consulted with someone before replying to some question or have
been approached by a community or political party representative during the interview are less
democratic.
In the last column we add further variables to measure the perception that individuals have
on the actions of the government. We only kept the variables that are significant (gappoor and
manage). Results support that those who think that the government is handling fairly/very
well the gap between poor and rich are less supportive of democracy than those who think that
the government is handling it badly. On the contrary, people who think that the government is
handling fairly well or very well the management of the economy are more democratic than those
who think that he is handling it badly. Individuals who claim that they do not have enough
information about either issue are less democratic than the reference group.
The bottom panel of table 2 shows some goodness of fit criteria, namely, the log-likelihood
values and the Bayesian information criterion. Both of these measures record their lowest values
in the last column, hence in the rest of the paper our baseline specification for the estimation
will be the model in column [6]. In this specification, the coefficient on gender is substantially
higher than that on having had some primary education and of about the same magnitude as
having regular access to a radio, indicating its economic significance.
Our results provide evidence that women are less democratic than men and are robust
to the inclusion of various individual socioeconomic characteristics. Overall, the individual
characteristics have only a moderate impact on the gender gap, increasing the coefficient on
women from -0.396 to -0.272, i.e. by 30 percent. In particular, although education and access
to media reduce the magnitude of the coefficient on gender, they do not fully explain the gap in
support for democracy between males and females. This conclusion supports the existence of a
gender gap, and in the following sections we test some potential explanations.
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5.2 The gender gap in policy priorities
Our aim in this section is to investigate whether women and men have different political pref-
erences which in turn explain the gap on support for democracy. As we saw in section 2, the
existing literature has emphasized that females are more likely to ask more supply of social
goods and less of political issues compared to males. For instance Edlund and Pande (2002)
conclude that in Western Europe women’s vote resulted in government spending moving away
from “guns ”and into “butter ”, Chattopadhyay and Duflo (2004) and Clots-Figueras (2011)
argue that in India the type of goods supplied depends on the gender of the political leaders
and generally female leaders invest more in goods linked to women concerns such as drinking
water, children issues or health provisions. Most of existing work has analyzed either the impact
of female suffrage on government spending or the types of goods that are provided by female
leaders. There are no studies that test directly on individual data whether there exists a gender
gap in policy priorities. To do this, we start by defining categories of individual policy priorities
before testing how the two sexes differ across the different policy priorities that we propose. We
will then examine to what extent the gender gaps in policy priorities explain the gender gap in
support for democracy.
Since we have two possible ways of measuring individual preferences (see section 3.2) we run
regressions for both. Results using the core measure where we attribute to an individual priority
k if s/he replies that at least two of the problems that the government should handle are of type
k ( priorities 1 ) are reported in table 3. Those for the other measure are qualitatively equivalent
and are relegated to table 4 in the appendix.
Columns [1]-[5] of table 3 report the results for the estimations of the 5 different priorities
and the last column, [6], shows the estimations for the category nothing. The results indicate
that there is a gender gap in preferences for social-discrimination and politics. Being female
increases the probability to consider social-discrimination as a policy priority (see column [2])
and decreases the probability to have politics-war as policy priority (see column [3]). In contrast,
the coefficients on gender are negative but insignificant for the estimations of the probabilities
to have macro, infrastructure or agriculture as priorities.
Education has a positive and significant impact on the probabilities to have macro and
politics as priorities, no significant effect on social-discrimination, and a negative one on the
probability to claim that infrastructure and agriculture are major problems that he govern-
ment should address. Living in an urban area increases the probability to be concerned with
macroeconomics, social issues and politics, and has a negative effect for the other categories.
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Employment status remains significant only in the first column, indicating that unemployed
people are more concerned by macroeconomic aspects than employed people. Access to media
by radio decreases the probability to have social-discrimination as priority while access to media
by TV increases the probability to have macro and politics as priorities but decreases the prob-
ability for infrastructure. Getting information from newspapers also increases the probability
to have politics as priority.
The variables reported by the interviewers (presence, check, influence, approach) seem to
have no significant effect on the estimations. We have also included in the table a variable vote
which tells us whether the citizen has voted during the last elections or not. The reference
group are people who have voted while the category vote1 groups people who have not been
able to vote for some reason and vote2 are those who have decided not to vote. We do not find
evidence that participation in the last election is an important determinant of the probability
of having politics as priority. We have added the variable freedomjoin which tells us how free to
join a political organization an individual feels, and the results show that individuals who think
that people are not very free (freedomjoin1 ) and those thinking that people are completely
free (freedomjoin2 ) have a lower probability to claim politics is the most important problem
compared to people who think that there is no freedom at all. In addition, the variable fightcorp
measures how well or badly does the government fight corruption. People who think that the
government is fighting corruption well (fightcorp1 ) are more likely to be concerned about social
issues and are less likely to have politics as their priority, relative to those who think that the
government is fighting corruption badly.
5.3 Policy priorities and the gender gap in support for democracy
In order to test whether the differential support of democracy across genders is due to men and
women having different priorities, we reestimate our core regression and add dummies for the
various policy priorities: macro, social-discrimination, politics, infrastructure, agriculture and
nothing. The results are displayed in table 4. Columns [1], [2] and [3] use the first measure of
individual priorities while columns [4], [5] and [6] use the second one. In panel A are reported
the estimates of the core variables already used in table 2, while panel B reports the estimates
on priorities. Most of the signs and the coefficients of the variables in panel A remain unchanged
once we control by individual policy priorities, with a few exceptions (for example, the estimated
parameter on inactive people, employ2, becomes significant at the 1% level). The size of the
coefficient on gender is not significantly different from our earlier specification, indicating that
priorities per se do not explain the gender gap in democratic support.
19
In columns [1] and [4] we include the priorities alone without any interaction with gender.
We find in [1] that only macro and social-discrimination are significant. Both have a positive
sign, indicating that having macro or social-discrimination as policy preferences increases the
probability to support democracy. The dummy social-discrimination becomes insignificant once
we adopt the second measure for priorities in column [4]. Politics, infrastructure and agriculture
are insignificant in all specifications.
The previous subsection provided evidence that gender affects whether an individual’s pri-
orities are politics or social aspects; see table 3 above. We next explore whether these two
priorities have differential effects across the genders. To do so, we interact gender with these
two variables, and the results are reported in columns [2] and [5]. We find that the coefficient on
the interacted term between politics and gender is significant and positive, meaning that once
females become interested in politics they are more supportive for democracy than men. Similar
conclusions are drawn in columns [3] and [6] where we have dropped the insignificant interacted
terms between gender and social-discrimination.
These results provide evidence that controlling by individual policy priorities does not offsets
the gender gap in support for democracy. Interestingly, the combination of the coefficient on
gender and that on poliwar*gender yields a positive coefficient, indicating that once females are
interested in politics they become more supportive of democracy than males.
5.4 Development, institutions and the gender gap in support for democracy
The next question we address is whether the inclusion of country level characteristics affects the
gender gap. The empirical results are displayed in table 6, where we add to the previous variables
country level measures of development, gender gaps, and institutions. Panels A and B report
the coefficients on individual socioeconomic variables and policy priorities, respectively, while
panel C presents the coefficients on country level variables, both on their own and interacted
with gender. We do not find major changes on the estimated coefficients on the variables in
panels A and B.
The direct impact of gender on support for democracy remains significant and negative in all
specifications, but the absolute value of the estimated coefficient has increased substantially. In
table 2, column (6), we find a coefficient on gender equals 0.272 while in table 6 after controlling
by institutions this value rises to roughly 0.9. One possible interpretation is that in the former
table the coefficient on gender reflects the impact of females on support for democracy when the
measures of institutions are taken at their average levels, while in the latter table the coefficient
on gender captures the impact of females on support for democracy when the level of institutions
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are at their lowest values.
The first regression indicates that the level of HDI does not have a significant effect on
its own but has a positive and significant coefficient when interacted with gender, suggesting
that although development does not affect the political views of men it decreases the negative
impact of being female on support for democracy. We next add, one by one, measures of the
literacy gap between men and women, female presence in parliament, and the three measures
of political institutions, civil rights, democracy and political rights. Although the gender gap
in education has a negative and significant effect, the interacted term proves insignificant. This
implies that in countries with large male-female gaps there is less support for democracy but
the impact is the same for the two genders. Female presence in parliament proves insignificant,
probably because it captures an aspect of gender equality that is too far removed from the daily
experiences of the majority of the population.
Turning to the three measures of political institutions we find, first, that democracy has
no impact either on its own or interacted with gender. This contrasts with the argument put
forward by Maseland and van Hoorn (2011) that support for democracy is greater the less
abundant it is, although the coefficient has the expected negative sign and its low significance
could be due to the lack variability in the measure of democracy in our small sample of countries.
Civil rights also has insignificant coefficients, while that on political rights is insignificant on its
own but positive and significant when interacted with gender. Column [7] presents our preferred
specification, which includes the variables that had significant coefficients in one of the previous
regressions (as well as HDI and PR on their own). This equation tells us that the only aggregate
variable having a (weakly) significant effect on the preferences of the whole population is the
educational gender gap, while a higher level of both the HDI and the PR indices tends to reduce
the gender gap in democratic support.
These results and in particular the effect of HDI on support for democracy seem to con-
tradict the debate on the impact of income on democracy, as re-examined by Acemoglu et al.
(2008) and Acemoglu et al. (2009). These two papers investigate the validity of the modern-
ization hypothesis as defined by Lipset (1959) that emphasizes the importance of the level of
economic development in the creation and consolidation of democracy. Using cross-country data
and different econometric specifications, the authors find neither a positive association between
income and democracy (see Acemoglu et al. (2008)) nor a positive impact of income on the
transition to or from democracy (see Acemoglu et al. (2009)).
We can now evaluate the overall effect of gender on support for democracy taking into
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account both the fact that country characteristics affect this gap and that women that report
having as priority political concerns show more support for democracy. We use the coefficients
reported in column [7] of table 6. From equation (1), we can write the odds ratio, rij , as
rij ≡
pij
1− pij
= ezij (10)
where zij is given by equation (7). The relative odds ratio in country j, defined as the odds
ratio for men over that for women, is then given by
rmj
rfj
=
1
exp
[
α1 + α
′
11 ∗HDIj + α
′′
11 ∗ PRj
] (11)
For those women who have poliwar as a priority we need to also add the coefficient on this term
to the expression in brackets.
Using each country’s values for the two aggregate variables we compute the total coefficient
on gender, i.e.
(
α1 + α
′
11 ∗HDIj + α
′′
11 ∗ PRj
)
, and the values are reported in table 6. Column
[3] reports the values for individuals for whom poliwar is equal to zero, while column [4] gives the
overall impact when this dummy takes the value 1, i.e. it reports the country specific coefficient
on gender for women who are interested in politics. In column [3], the total coefficient on gender
remains negative for all countries but the effect is insignificant for Botswana, Cape Verde,
Namibia and South Africa. In contrast in column [4], the overall coefficient is positive and
significant for these four countries and insignificant for the rest. These results imply that the
gender gap in democratic support is conditional on the economic and institutional environment
in which women live, with those in countries with high levels of development and political rights
being as democratic as men. Moreover, in all countries, women who are interested in politics
tend to show particularly strong support for democracy, surpassing in some cases that of men.
In the case where women do not have poliwar as a priority, the relative the relative odds
ratio is lowest and not significantly different from 1 for Botswana, Cape Verde, Namibia and
South Africa, and highest for Burkina Faso and Zimbabwe. In the latter countries it is 1.63 and
1.79, respectively, which, evaluated at the mean level of support for men in the country implies
a gap of 12 and 13 percentage points, respectively.17 For women who have poliwar as a priority,
there is no significant difference for most countries, except for Botswana Cape Verde, Namibia
and South Africa, for which women are 5 percentage points more likely to support democracy,
although this gap is only significant at the 10 percent level.
17To compute these figures we use the country coefficients just reported and calculate the relative ratio rmj/rfj =(
exp
[
α1 + α
′
11 ∗HDIj + α
′′
11 ∗ PRj
])
−1
. Using the fact that rmj = pmj/(1 − pmj) and rfj = pfj/(1 − pfj) we
get the difference between pmj and pfj . The value of pmj is the one for country j
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5.5 Alternative measures of democracy
In this section we explore further specifications to test the robustness of our results. The first
step consists in recoding the dummy support for democracy. It is possible that differences in
democratic support are driven by the fact that women are more likely than men not to reply to
the question or to say that the political regime does not matter for them. In figure 1 we see,
for instance, that there are roughly 5% of males reply they don’t know, but the value rises to
10% for females. Hence we first exclude all individuals that reply ”I don’t know”, and build the
variable democracy 1 which takes a value of 1 if the individual says that ”democracy is preferable
to any other kind of government” and zero if s/he replies either that ”in some circumstances
a non-democratic government can be preferable” or ”for some like me it does not matter what
kind of government”. We also construct the dummy democracy 2 which considers only those
that say that democracy is preferable (value of 1) and those who reply that a non-democratic
government may be preferable (value of 0).
The results are reported in the first two columns of table 7. Across columns the gender gap
in preference for democracy remains significant and large. Comparing columns [1] and [2] with
column [7] in table 6 we see, in panel B, that the covariates socialdis and poliwar*gender become
insignificant when we use the dummy democracy 2 as dependent variable. The coefficient on
gender is now lower than in the earlier regression, and the effect is offset by a larger impact of
political rights (coefficients of 0.0709 and 0.0832, compared to 0.052 in the previous table). In
contrast, the coefficient on HDI interacted with gender has lost its significance. These results
indicate that the difference across genders that our earlier regressions and previous work capture
does not simply reflect the fact that women are less likely to express an opinion on the desirability
of a democratic regime. In particular, column [2] indicates that even when the only two options
consider are ”democracy is preferable” and ”a non-democratic government can be preferable”
differences across genders persist.
As with our earlier measure of democracy, we compute the overall effect of gender on the
probability to support democracy to see whether the impact of institutions is sufficiently strong
to offset the direct gender effect. The computations are reported in table 8. The first two
columns correspond to the estimation in column [1] of table 7, and we report the coefficient
for both women who do not have poliwar as their policy priority and those who do; the next
column corresponds to the estimation in column [2] of table 7, and we compute a single coefficient
since the coefficient on poliwar*gender was insignificant. The results are even stronger than in
table 6. For the first specification the overall coefficient on gender is significant for 11 countries
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for women who do not have politics as priority and for none for those who do. For the second, it
is significant for only 8 countries out of 20 countries in our sample. That is, although a gender
gap in democratic support persists when we use the alternative measures, the effect of political
institutions is strong and implies that in about half of the countries in our sample relatively
high political rights erode this gap.
The last issue that we examine is whether the gender gap is also present when we use other
views on the political system as proxies for democratic support. We consider three questions
reported in the survey (questions 31, 32 and 38) which ask: whether the leader should be
chosen through regular open and honest elections, whether many political parties are needed,
and whether the number of turns for a leader should be limited. For each of these questions we
create a dummy (denoted elections, plurality and limits, respectively) which takes a value of 1 if
the person answers yes and zero otherwise. The results are reported in the last three columns of
table 7. Surprisingly, the regression for support for elections, column [3], does not imply a gender
gap. Both the coefficient on gender and those of gender interacted with aggregate variables are
insignificant. Only poliwar*gender has a significant coefficient, implying that women are in
general as likely as men to support choosing the leader through elections, and those that are
interested in politics even more. The regressions for plurality and presidential limits, columns [4]
and [5], replicate our main results, with the coefficient on gender being negative and significant
but offset by the interaction between gender and either HDI or PR.
These results point towards the role of conflict as a possible explanation for the gender gap
in democratic support. Women are as likely as men to reply that the country’s leader should be
chosen through elections, yet tend to disapprove of plurality and limits to terms in office. The
presence of many parties and attempts to force a leader in power not to run again for election
can be seen as potential sources of conflict, giving a possible explanation of why women show
less support for these features of a democratic regime while being as likely as men to reply that
leaders should be chosen through elections.
6 Conclusion
The role of women in development has received substantial attention in recent years. Females
have been argued to take different decisions from men, whether at the level of households or
in the political arena. Greater education of mothers increases the schooling of children, female
control over domestic finances raises expenditures in health and food, and female policy-makers
increase the availability of public goods. Based on this evidence, the 2012 World Development
24
Report emphasized the importance of women for development. At the same time, evidence
trying to understand the determinants of support for democracy in developing countries has
found that women are less supportive than men, raising the question of whether female attitudes
can hamper the much-needed democratic legitimacy in these countries.
In this paper we have tried to understand to what extent there exists a gender gap in
democratic support and what may be its potential causes. Our data for 20 Sub-Saharan African
countries indicate that there is an 8 percentage points gap between the support expressed by
men and that of women. We consider three possible hypotheses. First we examine whether
socioeconomic characteristics can explain this gap. For example, women are less educated and
are likely to have less access to media than men, and since both these characteristics are positively
correlated with democratic support they could cause the gap. Our results indicate that even
after controlling for a wide range of socioeconomic variables the gender gap remains large and
significant.
We then test two further hypotheses. The first is that men and women have different policy
priorities, with women being more interested in social issues and men in the political decision
making process. It could then be that women see democracy as being less important than the
actual policies implemented and thus are more likely to reply that in some circumstances a
non-democratic regime may be better. Alternatively, the gap could be due to the economic and
institutional context in which women live. The level of development, measures of gender gaps,
and institutional quality may all affect women’s responses. As proposed by the ’modernization
hypothesis’ of Inglehart (1997), changes in the economic and political environment may induce
a decrease of the differences in gender roles and increase women’s interest in issues traditionally
considered to be the domain of men, such as politics.
We find that differences in policy priorities do not erode the gender gap. In contrast, aggre-
gate variables have a major impact, and in countries with a sufficiently high level of the Human
Development Index and political rights there is no significant difference in the replies of the
two sexes. Such evidence implies that the observed gender gap in democratic support does not
capture intrinsic differences in the preferences of men and women but rather that it is highly
dependent on the economic and institutional climate in which women live. However, our tests
for the impact of the gender gap in education or political representation at the country level
indicate that these variables have no effect on differences in democratic support, raising the
question of whether the modernization hypothesis is a suitable explanation for our findings. An
alternative hypothesis is that women’s lower support for democracy comes from the fact that
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democratic transitions are often associated with civil conflict. If women have a higher cost of
conflict than men, then they are less likely to support democracy. Our analysis seems to point
in this direction. When asked whether the country’s leader should be chosen through open
elections, women respond yes as often as men. However, they are less likely to support party
plurality and limits on re-election. It is possible that these two aspects are seen by women as
sources of potential conflict and hence as the ’down side of democracy’, which would explain
their replies to the broader question of whether they think democracy is the best possible regime.
The relationship between conflict, gender and democratic support is, in our view, an issue that
merits detailed investigation in the future.
26
References
Abrams, B. A. and R. F. Settle (1999). Women’s suffrage and the growth ofthe welfare states.
Public Choice 100, 289–300.
Acemoglu, D., S. Johnson, and J. A. Robinson (2005). Institutions as the Fundamental Cause
of Long-Run Economic Growth. In P. Agion and S. Durlauf (Eds.), Handbook of Economic
Growth, Amsterdam, pp. 385–472. North Holland.
Acemoglu, D., S. Johnson, J. A. Robinson, and P. Yared (2008). Income and democracy.
American Economic Review 98, 808–842.
Acemoglu, D., S. Johnson, J. A. Robinson, and P. Yared (2009). Reevaluating the modern-
ization hypothesis. Journal of Monetary Economics 56, 1043–1058.
Aidt, T. S. and B. Dallal (2008). Female voting power: the contribution of women’s to the
growth of social spending in Western Europe (1869-1960). Public Choice 134, 391–417.
Bahry, D. (1987). Politics, generations, and change in the ussr. In J. R. Millar (Ed.), Politics,
work, and the dialy life in the USSR: A survey of former soviet citizens. Cambridge, UK:
Cambridge University Press.
Barro, R. (1999). The Determinant of Democracy. Journal of Political Economy 107, S158–
S183.
Bhalotra, S. and I. Clots-Figueras (2011). Health and the political agency women. Discussion
Paper No. 6216.
Brachinger, A.-W., M. Brown, M. Gysler, and R. Schubert (1999). Financial decision-making:
are women really more risk-averse? American Economic Review 89, 381–385.
Branisa, B., S. Klasen, and M. Ziegler (2009). New measures of gender inequality: The
social institutions and gender index (sigi) and its subindices. Courant Research Centre
’Poverty, Equity and Growth in Developing and Transition Countries: Statistical Methids
and Empirical Analysis’ Discussion Papers, No. 10.
Bratton, M. and R. Mattes (2005). Public opinion, democracy, and market reform in Africa.
Cambridge University Press.
Burns, N. (2007). Gender in the aggregate, gender in the individual, gender and political
action. Politics and Gender 3, 104–124.
Carnaghan, E. and D. Bahry (1990). Political attitudes and the gender gap in the USSR.
Comparative Politics 26, 379–399.
27
Cavalcanti, T. V. D. V. and J. Tavares (2011). Women Prefer Larger Governments: Growth,
Structural, Transformation, and Government Size. Economic Inquiry. 49, 155–171.
Cervellati, M. and U. Sunde (2011). Civil Conflict, Democratization and Growth: Violent
Democratization as Critical Juncture. mimeo.
Cervellati, M. and U. Sunde (2012). Democratizing for Peace? The Effect of Democratization
on Civil Conflits. mimeo.
Chattopadhyay, R. and E. Duflo (2004). Women as Policy Makers: Evidence from a Ran-
domized Policy Experiment in India. Econometrica 72, 1409–1443.
Clots-Figueras, I. (2011). Women in politics: Evidence from the Indian States. Journal of
Public Economics 95, 664–690.
Coffe, H. and C. Bolzendahl (2011). Gender Gaps in Political Participation Across Sub-
Saharan African Nations. Social Indicators Research 102, 245–264.
Diamond, L. (1999). Developing democracy: Toward consolidation. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins
University Press.
Edlund, L. and R. Pande (2002). Why Have Women Become Left-Wing? The Political Gender
Gap and the Decline in Marriage. The Quarterly Journal of Economics 117, 917–961.
Edlund, L., R. Pande, and L. Haider (2005). Unmarried Parenthood and Redistributive Pol-
itics. Journal of the European Economic Association 3, 95–119.
Evans, G. and P. Rose (2007). Support for Democracy in Malawi: Does Schooling Matter?
World Development 35, 904–919.
Fails, M. D. and H. N. Pierce (2010). Changing Mass Attitudes and Democratic Deepening.
Political Research Quarterly 63, 174–187.
Funk, P. and C. Gathmann (2010). Gender Gaps in Policy Making: Evidence from Direct
Democracy in Switzerland. UPF working paper No. 1126.
Harttgen, K. and S. Klasen (2012). A Household-Based Human Development Index. World
Development 40, 878–899.
Hox, J. (2010). Multilevel Analysis: Techniques and Applications. Quantitative and Method-
ology Series, Routledge.
Inglehart, R. (1997).Modernization and Postmodernization: Cultural, Economic, and Political
Change in 43 societies. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
28
Inglehart, R. and P. Norris (2003). The Rising Tide: Gender Equality and Cultural Change
Around the World. Cambridge: New York and Cambridge University Press: Cambridge
University Press.
Klasen, S. and D. Schu¨ler (2011). Reforming the Gender-Related Development Index and the
Gender Empowerment Measure: Implementing some Specific Proposals. Feminist Eco-
nomics 17, 1–30.
Langer, G. (1996). The Gender Gap Makes a Difference. ABCNews.com.
Lipset, S. M. (1959). Some social requisites of democracy: Economic development and political
legitimacy. American Political Science Review 53, 69–105.
Lipset, S. M. (1963). Political man: The social bases of politics. Garden City, NY: Anchor.
Lott, J. R. and L. W. Kenny (1999). Did Women’s Suffrage Change the Size and Scope of
Government. Journal of Political Economy 107, 1163–1198.
Maseland, R. and A. van Hoorn (2011). Why Muslims like democracy yet have so little. Public
Choice 147, 481–496.
Mattes, R. and M. Bratton (2001). African’s surprising universalism. Journal of Democ-
racy 12, 107–121.
Mattes, R. and M. Bratton (2007). Learning about democracy in Africa: Awareness, perfor-
mance, and experience. American Journal of Political Science 51, 192–217.
Mattes, R. and D. Mughogho (2009). The Limited Impacts of Formal Education on Demo-
cratic Citizenship in Africa?. Afrobarometer WORKING PAPER NO 109.
Nannicini, T. and R. Ricciuti (2010). Autocratic transitions and growth. CESifo working
paper No 2967.
Persson, T. (2004). Consequences of Constitutions. Journal of the European Economic Asso-
ciation 2, 139–161.
Persson, T. and G. Tabellini (2006). Democracy and Development: The Devil in the Details.
American Economic Review 96, 319–324.
Resnick, D. and D. Casale (2011). The Political Participation of Africa’s Youth: Turnout
Partisanship and Protest. American Journal of Political Science 51, 192–217.
Rowley, C. K. and N. Smith (2009). Islam’s democracy paradox: Muslims claim to like democ-
racy, so why do they have so little? Public Choice 139, 273–299.
29
Sen, A. (1999a). Development as Freedom. New York: Anchor.
Sen, A. K. (1999b). Democracy as a Universal Value. Journal of Democracy 10.
Shafiq, M. N. (2010). Do education and income affect support for democracy in Muslim
countries? Evidence from the Pew Global Attitudes Project. Economics and Education
Review 29, 461–469.
Swamy, A., S. Knack, Y. Lee, and O. Azfar (2001). Gender and corruption. Journal of Devel-
opment Economics 64, 25–55.
Waldrom-Moore, P. (1999). Eastern Europe at the crossroads of democratic transition. Com-
parative Political Studies 32, 32–62.
30
Figure 1: Support for democracy by gender
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Table 1: Descriptive Statistics: Afrobarometer data
Variable Categories
Support for Democracy is Don’t Doesn’t Non democracy
democracy preferable Know matter can be preferable
69.68% 7.68% 11.57% 11.11%
Gender Females Males
49.99% 50.01%
Education No formal Incomplete Completed Completed Post
20.32% primary primary secondary secondary
18.34% 35.45% 15.12% 10.77%
Age [18-25] [26-35] >35
27.36% 29.57% 43.07%
Location Rural Urban
62.18% 37.82%
Employment Employed Unemployed Inactive
59.99% 5.65% 34.36%
Access to media Radio TV News papers
86.81% 54.44% 40.66%
Perception of Ever Never
corruption experienced experienced
21.27% 78.73%
Presence of someone Noone Husband Childreen Someone else
during the interview 65.97% 6.74% 12.27% 14.01%
Does the individual No Yes
check someone 94.69% 5.31%
Is the individual No Yes
influenced 95.58% 4.42%
Approached by community or No Yes
party member 98.57% 1.43%
32
Figure 2: Distribution of policy priorities
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Table 2: Support for democracy
Reference variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Male gender −0.396
(0.028)
∗∗∗
−0.341
(0.028)
∗∗∗
−0.317
(0.028)
∗∗∗
−0.297
(0.029)
∗∗∗
−0.283
(0.029)
∗∗∗
−0.272
(0.029)
∗∗∗
No formal educ1 0.219
(0.046)
∗∗∗ 0.239
(0.047)
∗∗∗ 0.201
(0.048)
∗∗∗ 0.197
(0.048)
∗∗∗ 0.186
(0.048)
∗∗∗
educ2 0.552
(0.042)
∗∗∗ 0.593
(0.044)
∗∗∗ 0.531
(0.046)
∗∗∗ 0.525
(0.047)
∗∗∗ 0.501
(0.047)
∗∗∗
educ3 0.676
(0.052)
∗∗∗ 0.729
(0.056)
∗∗∗ 0.649
(0.059)
∗∗∗ 0.636
(0.059)
∗∗∗ 0.607
(0.059)
∗∗∗
educ4 0.922
(0.059)
∗∗∗ 0.928
(0.063)
∗∗∗ 0.832
(0.068)
∗∗∗ 0.813
(0.068)
∗∗∗ 0.780
(0.068)
∗∗∗
18-25 age2 0.102
(0.037)
∗∗∗ 0.106
(0.038)
∗∗∗ 0.109
(0.038)
∗∗∗ 0.104
(0.038)
∗∗∗
age3 0.295
(0.036)
∗∗∗ 0.299
(0.037)
∗∗∗ 0.309
(0.037)
∗∗∗ 0.307
(0.037)
∗∗∗
Rural urban 0.104
(0.032)
∗∗∗ 0.065
(0.034)
∗ 0.063
(0.034)
∗ 0.060
(0.034)
∗
Employed employ1 −0.043
(0.031)
−0.032
(0.032)
−0.029
(0.032)
−0.039
(0.032)
employ2 −0.153
(0.062)
∗∗
−0.128
(0.063)
∗∗
−0.115
(0.063)
∗
−0.128
(0.063)
∗∗
No access radio 0.271
(0.044)
∗∗∗ 0.267
(0.044)
∗∗∗ 0.251
(0.044)
∗∗∗
tv 0.065
(0.039)
∗ 0.062
(0.039)
0.061
(0.039)
paper 0.096
(0.039)
∗∗ 0.095
(0.039)
∗∗ 0.083
(0.039)
∗∗
Never corruption −0.181
(0.037)
∗∗∗
−0.180
(0.037)
∗∗∗
−0.184
(0.037)
∗∗∗
No one presence2 −0.024
(0.059)
−0.027
(0.059)
presence3 −0.115
(0.044)
∗∗∗
−0.113
(0.045)
∗∗
presence4 0.064
(0.0446)
0.063
(0.045)
No check −0.213
(0.078)
∗∗∗
−0.203
(0.078)
∗∗∗
No influence −0.143
(0.086)
∗
−0.150
(0.086)
∗
No approach −0.436
(0.118)
∗∗∗
−0.376
(0.119)
∗∗∗
Badly gappoor1 −0.204
(0.038)
∗∗∗
gappoor2 −0.364
(0.067)
∗∗∗
manage1 0.168
(0.033)
∗∗∗
manage2 −0.292
(0.067)
∗∗∗
Constant 1.075
(0.128)
∗∗∗ 0.642
(0.133)
∗∗∗ 0.441
(0.138)
∗∗∗ 0.229
(0.142)
0.259
(0.143)
∗ 0.306
(0.142)
∗∗
LL -15638 -15438 -15116 -14777 -14690 -14607
BIC 31306 30948 30354 29716 29604 29479
Obs 26,938 26,897 26,501 26,062 25,953 25,918
Nb countries 20 20 20 20 20 20
The table reports coefficients from the logit estimation, the dependent variable is support for
democracy. Standard errors are in parenthesis. *** significant at 1%, ** significant at 5%, * significant
at 10%.
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Table 3: Gender and priorities
Reference variable [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6]
Male gender −0.047
(0.044)
0.185
(0.029)
∗∗∗
−0.203
(0.083)
∗∗
−0.040
(0.041)
−0.156
(0.152)
0.469
(0.225)
∗∗
No formal educ1 0.252
(0.093)
∗∗∗ 0.053
(0.093)
0.584
(0.217)
∗∗∗
−0.031
(0.065)
−0.286
(0.201)
−0.473
(0.294)
educ2 0.571
(0.083)
∗∗∗ 0.043
(0.047)
0.631
(0.204)
∗∗∗ 0.054
(0.204)
−0.959
(0.229)
∗∗∗
−1.408
(0.323)
∗∗∗
educ3 0.654
(0.095)
∗∗∗ 0.011
(0.059)
1.027
(0.215)
∗∗∗
−0.114
(0.082)
−0.895
(0.317)
∗∗∗
−1.664
(0.508)
∗∗∗
educ4 0.850
(0.099)
∗∗∗
−0.088
(0.065)
1.156
(0.218)
∗∗∗
−0.368
(0.098)
∗∗∗
−1.736
(0.500)
∗∗∗
−2.789
(1.050)
∗∗∗
18-25 age2 0.046
(0.057)
0.046
(0.039)
0.015
(0.111)
−0.068
(0.054)
0.473
(0.255)
∗
−1.082
(0.318)
∗∗∗
age3 −0.065
(0.059)
0.147
(0.039)
∗∗∗ 0.163
(0.110)
−0.096
(0.054)
∗ 0.664
(0.242)
∗∗∗
−0.759
(0.276)
∗∗∗
Rural urban 0.263
(0.049)
∗∗∗ 0.094
(0.034)
∗∗∗ 0.371
(0.092)
∗∗∗
−0.433
(0.049)
∗∗∗
−0.466
(0.200)
∗∗
−0.124
(0.263)
Employed Employ1 0.137
(0.047)
∗∗∗
−0.028
(0.032)
−0.097
(0.094)
−0.082
(0.044)
∗ 0.007
(0.165)
−0.144
(0.225)
Employ2 −0.072
(0.098)
0.067
(0.063)
−0.231
(0.179)
−0.096
(0.087)
0.077
(0.327)
−0.971
(0.732)
No access radio 0.029
(0.078)
−0.158
(0.045)
∗∗∗
−0.008
(0.170)
0.110
(0.063)
∗ 0.179
(0.213)
−0.410
(0.259)
tv 0.323
(0.061)
∗∗∗
−0.029
(0.038)
0.424
(0.128)
∗∗∗
−0.243
(0.052)
∗∗∗
−0.225
(0.189)
0.314
(0.273)
paper 0.073
(0.056)
−0.074
(0.039)
∗ 0.592
(0.116)
∗∗∗
−0.059
(0.053)
0.078
(0.215)
−0.117
(0.302)
Never corruption 0.104
(0.052)
∗∗
−0.026
(0.036)
−0.073
(0.098)
−0.025
(0.050)
−0.002
(0.210)
−0.304
(0.289)
No one presence2 0.102
(0.087)
−0.038
(0.059)
−0.110
(0.165)
−0.008
(0.081)
0.084
(0.278)
−2.164
(1.024)
∗∗
presence3 −0.055
(0.071)
0.064
(0.044)
−0.079
(0.139)
−0.051
(0.062)
0.004
(0.230)
−0.084
(0.292)
presence4 −0.044
(0.068)
0.032
(0.044)
−0.234
(0.136)
∗ 0.005
(0.061)
0.197
(0.228)
−0.488
(0.342)
check −0.104
(0.129)
−0.062
(0.081)
−0.015
(0.245)
0.077
(0.110)
−0.036
(0.387)
0.083
(0.583)
influence −0.083
(0.145)
0.137
(0.088)
0.103
(0.274)
0.084
(0.121)
0.449
(0.394)
−0.223
(0.665)
approach −0.116
(0.213)
−0.223
(0.133)
∗ 0.214
(0.365)
−0.159
(0.181)
−0.423
(0.729)
0.381
(0.766)
has voted vote1 −0.054
(0.056)
0.027
(0.037)
0.176
(0.102)
∗ 0.021
(0.053)
−0.019
(0.202)
0.401
(0.247)
vote2 0.189
(0.085)
∗∗
−0.027
(0.063)
0.111
(0.153)
−0.054
(0.092)
0.185
(0.335)
−0.032
(0.616)
Not free freedomjoin1 0.112
(0.104)
0.097
(0.069)
−0.429
(0.157)
∗∗∗ 0.144
(0.110)
0.468
(0.477)
−0.711
(0.380)
∗
freedomjoin2 0.110
(0.102)
−0.010
(0.068)
−0.552
(0.152)
∗∗∗ 0.329
(0.106)
∗∗∗ 0.440
(0.468)
−0.733
(0.358)
∗∗
Badly fightcorp1 −0.079
(0.047)
∗ 0.140
(0.031)
∗∗∗
−0.539
(0.092)
∗∗∗ 0.046
(0.042)
−0.280
(0.165)
∗ 0.468
(0.245)
∗
fightcorp2 −0.268
(0.096)
∗∗∗ 0.122
(0.054)
∗∗
−0.319
(0.210)
−0.081
(0.078)
0.062
(0.232)
0.476
(0.329)
Constant −3.176
(0.182)
∗∗∗
−1.011
(0.130)
∗∗∗
−4.502
(0.316)
∗∗∗
−1.950
(0.179)
∗∗∗
−5.268
(0.596)
∗∗∗
−4.525
(0.671)
∗∗∗
LL -7774 -14819 -2795 -8984 -1040 -5119
BIC 15832 29921 5874 18251 2364 1307
Obs 24,926 24,926 24,926 24,926 24,926 24,926
Nb countries 20 20 20 20 20 20
The table reports coefficients from the logit estimation, the dependent variables across columns are
policies priorities. To measure policy priorities we use the first codification defined in section 3.2. The
dependent variable is Macroeconomics in [1] , Social-discrimination in [2], Politics-war in [3],
Infrastructure in [4], Agriculture in [5] and Nothing in [6]. Standard errors are in parenthesis.
*** significant at 1%, ** significant at 5%, * significant at 10%
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Table 4: Support for democracy and priorities
priority version 1 priority version 2
Reference variable [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6]
Panel A
Male gender −0.274
(0.029)
∗∗∗
−0.276
(0.035)
∗∗∗
−0.282
(0.029)
∗∗∗
−0.273
(0.029)
∗∗∗
−0.327
(0.051)
∗∗∗
−0.307
(0.032)
∗∗∗
No formal educ1 0.183
(0.048)
∗∗∗ 0.183
(0.048)
∗∗∗ 0.183
(0.048)
∗∗∗ 0.181
(0.048)
∗∗∗ 0.181
(0.048)
∗∗∗ 0.182
(0.048)
∗∗∗
educ2 0.490
(0.047)
∗∗∗ 0.492
(0.047)
∗∗∗ 0.492
(0.047)
∗∗∗ 0.491
(0.047)
∗∗∗ 0.492
(0.047)
∗∗∗ 0.492
(0.047)
∗∗∗
educ3 0.595
(0.059)
∗∗∗ 0.593
(0.059)
∗∗∗ 0.593
(0.059)
∗∗∗ 0.590
(0.059)
∗∗∗ 0.591
(0.059)
∗∗∗ 0.591
(0.059)
∗∗∗
educ4 0.766
(0.068)
∗∗∗ 0.763
(0.068)
∗∗∗ 0.763
(0.068)
∗∗∗ 0.757
(0.068)
∗∗∗ 0.761
(0.068)
∗∗∗ 0.760
(0.068)
∗∗∗
Panel B
Macro 0.168
(0.052)
∗∗∗ 0.172
(0.051)
∗∗∗ 0.162
(0.051)
∗∗∗ 0.088
(0.033)
∗∗∗ 0.098
(0.031)
∗∗∗ 0.096
(0.031)
∗∗∗
Socialdis 0.089
(0.033)
∗∗∗ 0.094
(0.048)
∗∗ 0.082
(0.033)
∗∗ 0.023
(0.037)
Poliwar 0.054
(0.093)
0.066
(0.038)
∗
Infras 0.068
(0.047)
−0.034
(0.034)
Agri −0.183
(0.156)
−0.041
(0.039)
Nothing −0.467
(0.208)
∗∗
−0.476
(0.208)
∗∗
−0.475
(0.208)
∗∗ Ref Ref Ref
Socialdis*gender −0.021
(0.063)
0.011
(0.049)
Poliwar*gender 0.353
(0.143)
∗∗ 0.356
(0.143)
∗∗ 0.156
(0.050)
∗∗∗ 0.152
(0.049)
∗∗∗
Constant 0.267
(0.142)
∗ 0.279
(0.142)
∗∗ 0.282
(0.142)
∗∗ 0.269
(0.152)
∗ 0.271
(0.143)
∗ 0.272
(0.143)
∗
LL -14596 -14595 -14595 -14599 -14598 -14598
BIC 29517 29505 29495 29513 29491 29481
Obs 25,918 25,918 25,918 25,918 25,918 25,918
Nb countries 20 20 20 20 20 20
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Table 5: Support for democracy and institutions
Reference Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Panel A
Male gender −0.857
(0.138)
∗∗∗
−0.926
(0.160)
∗∗∗
−0.896
(0.140)
∗∗∗
−0.923
(0.141)
∗∗∗
−0.929
(0.151)
∗∗∗
−0.844
(0.138)
∗∗∗
−0.922
(0.141)
∗∗∗
No formal educ1 0.180
(0.048)
∗∗∗ 0.181
(0.048)
∗∗∗ 0.179
(0.048)
∗∗∗ 0.181
(0.048)
∗∗∗ 0.181
(0.048)
∗∗∗ 0.180
(0.048)
∗∗∗ 0.183
(0.048)
∗∗∗
educ2 0.487
(0.047)
∗∗∗ 0.487
(0.047)
∗∗∗ 0.486
(0.047)
∗∗∗ 0.490
(0.047)
∗∗∗ 0.488
(0.047)
∗∗∗ 0.488
(0.047)
∗∗∗ 0.492
(0.047)
∗∗∗
educ3 0.587
(0.059)
∗∗∗ 0.589
(0.059)
∗∗∗ 0.586
(0.059)
∗∗∗ 0.589
(0.059)
∗∗∗ 0.588
(0.059)
∗∗∗ 0.588
(0.059)
∗∗∗ 0.592
(0.059)
∗∗∗
educ4 0.762
(0.068)
∗∗∗ 0.762
(0.068)
∗∗∗ 0.760
(0.068)
∗∗∗ 0.764
(0.068)
∗∗∗ 0.763
(0.068)
∗∗∗ 0.762
(0.068)
∗∗∗ 0.766
(0.068)
∗∗∗
Panel B
Macro 0.163
(0.051)
∗∗∗ 0.164
(0.051)
∗∗∗ 0.163
(0.051)
∗∗∗ 0.163
(0.051)
∗∗∗ 0.163
(0.051)
∗∗∗ 0.163
(0.051)
∗∗∗ 0.164
(0.051)
∗∗∗
Socialdisp 0.082
(0.033)
∗∗ 0.082
(0.033)
∗∗ 0.082
(0.033)
∗∗ 0.083
(0.033)
∗∗ 0.082
(0.033)
∗∗ 0.082
(0.033)
∗∗ 0.082
(0.033)
∗∗
Poliwar*gender 0.330
(0.143)
∗∗ 0.328
(0.143)
∗∗ 0.323
(0.143)
∗∗ 0.335
(0.143)
∗∗ 0.331
(0.143)
∗∗ 0.329
(0.143)
∗∗ 0.335
(0.143)
∗∗
Nothing −0.464
(0.209)
∗∗
−0.466
(0.209)
∗∗
−0.469
(0.209)
∗∗
−0.466
(0.209)
∗∗
−0.466
(0.209)
∗∗
−0.464
(0.209)
∗∗
−0.467
(0.209)
∗∗
Panel C
HDI −0.683
(1.324)
0.927
(1.471)
−0.485
(1.286)
−1.009
(1.520)
−0.815
(1.742)
−0.707
(1.533)
0.942
(1.823)
HDI*gender 1.266
(0.297)
∗∗∗ 1.093
(0.356)
∗∗∗ 1.149
(0.306)
∗∗∗ 0.857
(0.347)
∗∗ 0.960
(0.393)
∗∗ 1.025
(0.347)
∗∗∗ 0.856
(0.347)
∗∗
GAP −1.660
(0.843)
∗∗
−1.531
(0.896)
∗
GAP*gender 0.181
(0.208)
NSEATS −0.019
(0.014)
NSEATS*gender 0.005
(0.0031)
CL 0.017
(0.157)
CL*gender 0.043
(0.036)
DEM 0.003
(0.058)
DEM*gender 0.017
(0.013)
PR 0.042
(0.099)
−0.018
(0.099)
PR*gender 0.052
(0.023)
∗∗ 0.052
(0.023)
∗∗
Constant 0.610
(0.609)
1.238
(0.646)
∗ 0.873
(0.622)
0.548
(0.618)
0.581
(0.665)
0.604
(0.608)
1.210
(0.695)
∗
LL -14586 -14584 -14584 -14585 -14585 -14583 -14581
BIC 29497 29513 29513 29514 29525 29511 29519
nb obs 25,918 25,918 25,918 25,918 25,918 25,918 25,918
nb countries 20 20 20 20 20 20 20
The table reports coefficients from the logit estimation, the dependent variable is support for
democracy. We use the first codification to measure policy priorities. All the regressors that are in
column 6 of table 2 have been included but not reported. Standard errors are in parenthesis. ***
denotes significant at 1%, ** significant at 5%, * significant at 10%.
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Table 6: Coefficients at country level
Country Values Total coeff on gender Relative odds ratio
Country HDI PR Poliwar=0 Poliwar=1 Poliwar=0 Poliwar=1
Benin 0.419 6 −0.250
(0.046)
∗∗∗ 0.085
(0.148)
1.284 0.919
Botswana 0.624 6 −0.075
(0.059)
0.260
(0.150)
∗ 1.078 0.771
Burkina 0.321 3 −0.491
(0.053)
∗∗∗
−0.156
(0.151)
1.633 1.168
Cape Verde 0.563 7 −0.075
(0.054)
0.260
(0.149)
∗ 1.078 0.771
Ghana 0.519 7 −0.112
(0.052)
∗∗ 0.223
(0.149)
1.119 0.800
Kenya 0.493 4 −0.291
(0.041)
∗∗∗ 0.044
(0.145)
1.338 0.957
Lesotho 0.436 6 −0.236
(0.043)
∗∗∗ 0.099
(0.147)
1.266 0.905
Liberia 0.328 5 −0.380
(0.055)
∗∗∗
−0.045
(0.152)
1.463 1.046
Madagasc 0.483 4 −0.300
(0.039)
∗∗∗ 0.035
(0.144)
1.349 0.965
Malawi 0.377 4 −0.390
(0.038)
∗∗∗
−0.055
(0.146)
1.478 1.057
Mali 0.346 6 −0.313
(0.064)
∗∗∗ 0.022
(0.156)
1.367 0.978
Mozambique 0.304 5 −0.401
(0.062)
∗∗∗
−0.066
(0.155)
1.493 1.068
Namibia 0.613 6 −0.084
(0.056)
0.251
(0.149)
∗ 1.088 0.778
Nigeria 0.446 4 −0.331
(0.035)
∗∗∗ 0.004
(0.144)
1.392 0.996
Senegal 0.451 6 −0.223
(0.041)
∗∗∗ 0.112
(0.146)
1.249 0.894
South Afr 0.608 6 −0.088
(0.055)
0.247
(0.148)
∗ 1.092 0.781
Tanzania 0.448 4 −0.330
(0.035)
∗∗∗ 0.005
(0.144)
1.390 0.995
Uganda 0.43 3 −0.397
(0.048)
∗∗∗
−0.062
(0.148)
1.488 1.064
Zambia 0.413 5 −0.307
(0.034)
∗∗∗ 0.028
(0.145)
1.359 0.973
Zimbabwe 0.338 1 −0.580
(0.081)
∗∗∗
−0.245
(0.162)
1.787 1.278
39
Table 7: Alternative measures of support for democracy
Reference Variable [1] [2] [3] [4] [5]
Panel A
Male gender −0.778
(0.151)
∗∗∗
−0.643
(0.211)
∗∗∗
−0.192
(0.153)
−0.491
(0.136)
∗∗∗
−0.606
(0.138)
∗∗∗
No formal educ1 0.094
(0.055)
∗ 0.150
(0.074)
∗∗ 0.121
(0.054)
∗∗ 0.046
(0.046)
0.285
(0.048)
∗∗∗
educ2 0.250
(0.053)
∗∗∗ 0.297
(0.070)
∗∗∗ 0.152
(0.051)
∗∗∗ 0.230
(0.044)
∗∗∗ 0.451
(0.046)
∗∗∗
educ3 0.356
(0.065)
∗∗∗ 0.349
(0.086)
∗∗∗ 0.280
(0.064)
∗∗∗ 0.294
(0.056)
∗∗∗ 0.630
(0.059)
∗∗∗
educ4 0.533
(0.073)
∗∗∗ 0.430
(0.094)
∗∗∗ 0.356
(0.072)
∗∗∗ 0.443
(0.063)
∗∗∗ 0.682
(0.066)
∗∗∗
Panel B
Macro 0.121
(0.055)
∗∗ 0.154
(0.074)
∗∗ 0.078
(0.055)
−0.116
(0.046)
∗∗ 0.115
(0.051)
∗∗
Socialdis 0.066
(0.036)
∗ 0.069
(0.048)
−0.054
(0.035)
0.0403
(0.031)
0.008
(0.032)
Poliwar*gender 0.327
(0.154)
∗∗ 0.111
(0.185)
0.325
(0.158)
∗∗ 0.254
(0.134)
∗ 0.104
(0.138)
Nothing −0.486
(0.231)
∗∗
−0.371
(0.306)
−0.023
(0.231)
−0.080
(0.200)
−0.251
(0.207)
Panel C
HDI 2.052
(1.825)
3.236
(1.768)
∗ 0.626
(1.706)
0.266
(1.067)
−0.518
(1.923)
HDI*gender 0.491
(0.368)
0.151
(0.489)
0.147
(0.375)
−0.0811
(0.327)
0.878
(0.345)
∗∗
GAP −1.823
(0.896)
∗∗
−1.703
(0.863)
∗∗
−1.270
(0.836)
−0.339
(0.521)
−0.697
(0.945)
PR −0.051
(0.099)
−0.171
(0.097)
∗
−0.058
(0.093)
−0.0532
(0.0583)
−0.0472
(0.105)
PR*gender 0.071
(0.025)
∗∗∗ 0.083
(0.036)
∗∗ 0.012
(0.025)
0.071
(0.022)
∗∗∗ 0.002
(0.023)
Constant 1.664
(0.697)
∗∗ 2.513
(0.680)
∗∗∗ 2.054
(0.651)
∗∗∗ 1.035
(0.410)
∗∗ 1.451
(0.732)
∗∗
LL -12568 -7916 -13150 -16086 -14939
BIC 25488 16181 26656 32528 30234
Nb obs 24,041 21,053 25,916 25,920 25,917
Nb country 20 20 20 20 20
Table reports coefficients from the logit estimation, The dependent variable is democracy1 in [1] and
democracy2 in [2]. All the regressors that are in column 6 of table 2 have been included but not
reported. Standard errors are in parenthesis. *** significant at 1%, ** significant at 5%, * significant at
10%.
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Table 8: Coefficient at country level
Country Values Total coeff on gender Total coeff on gender
[1] [2]
country HDI PR poliwarp=0 poliwarp=1 poliwarp=0
Benin 0.419 6 −0.353
(0.242)
−0.026
(0.289)
−0.218
(0.247)
Botswana 0.624 6 −0.353
(0.242)
−0.026
(0.270)
−0.218
(0.247)
Burkina 0.321 3 −0.565
(0.217)
∗∗∗
−0.238
(0.256)
−0.430
(0.203)
∗∗
Cape Verde 0.563 7 −0.282
(0.255)
0.045
(0.298)
−0.147
(0.270)
Ghana 0.519 7 −0.282
(0.255)
0.045
(0.298)
−0.147
(0.270)
Kenya 0.493 4 −0.494
(0.223)
∗∗
−0.167
(0.271)
−0.359
(0.213)
∗
Lesotho 0.436 6 −0.353
(0.242)
−0.026
(0.287)
−0.218
(0.247)
Liberia 0.328 5 −0.424
(0.231)
∗
−0.097
(0.278)
−0.289
(0.228)
Madagascar 0.483 4 −0.494
(0.223)
∗∗
−0.167
(0.271)
−0.359
(0.213)
∗
Malawi 0.377 4 −0.494
(0.223)
∗∗
−0.167
(0.271)
−0.359
(0.213)
∗
Mali 0.346 6 −0.353
(0.242)
−0.026
(0.287)
−0.218
(0.247)
Mozambique 0.304 5 −0.424
(0.231)
∗
−0.097
(0.278)
−0.289
(0.228)
Namibia 0.613 6 −0.353
(0.242)
−0.026
(0.287)
−0.218
(0.247)
Nigeria 0.446 4 −0.494
(0.223)
∗∗
−0.167
(0.271)
−0.359
(0.213)
∗
Senegal 0.451 6 −0.353
(0.242)
−0.026
(0.287)
−0.218
(0.247)
South Afr 0.608 6 −0.353
(0.242)
−0.026
(0.287)
−0.218
(0.247)
Tanzania 0.448 4 −0.494
(0.223)
∗∗
−0.167
(0.271)
−0.359
(0.213)
∗
Uganda 0.430 3 −0.565
(0.217)
∗∗∗
−0.238
(0.266)
−0.430
(0.203)
∗∗
Zambia 0.413 5 −0.424
(0.231)
∗
−0.097
(0.278)
−0.289
(0.228)
Zimbabwe 0.338 1 −0.707
(0.213)
∗∗∗
−0.380
(0.262)
−0.572
(0.202)
∗∗∗
[1] corresponds to the estimation in column [1] of Table 7 and [2] corresponds to the estimation in
column [2] of Table 7. In bold are significant coefficients. Standard errors are in parenthesis.
*** significant at 1%, ** significant at 5%, * significant at 10%.
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Table A 1: Data sources
The Afrobarometer data can be accessed at http://www.afrobarometer.org/.
The indexes of HDI, literacy rates and the seats held by women at the national courts are available at
http://hdr.undp.org/en/statistics/.
The indexes of political rights and civil liberties can be acessed at hthttp://www.freedomhouse.org/
Polity V is available at http://www.systemicpeace.org/polity/polity4.htm.
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Table A 2: Description of priorities
Macro Management of the economy, Wages income and salaries
Unemployment, Rates and Taxes
Social-discrim Poverty/Destitution, Food/shortage/Famine
Education, Housing, Orphans/street
children/homeless children, Health, AIDS
Sickness/disease,Discrimination/inequality
Gender issues/women’s rights
Politics-war Crime and security, Corruption
Political violence
Political instability/political division/ethnic tensions
Democracy/political rights, international and civil war
Infras Transportation,Communications
Infrastructure/roads, Electricity
Water supply, services, Agricultural marketing
Barrage, Moulin
Agri Farming/agriculture, Drought
Land, Farm inputs
Table A 3: Descriptive Statistics for Institutions
Variable Mean STD Min Max Data source
HDI 0.454 0.096 0.304 0.624 African Development Indicators, UNDP
Nationalseats 18.6 9.32 7 34.8 African Development Indicators, UNDP
GAP 0.812 0.162 0.522 1.150 African Development Indicators, UNDP
DEM 5.786 2.719 1 10 Polity V
PR 4.824 1.471 1 7 Freedom House
CL 4.913 1.066 2 7 Freedom House
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Table A 4: Gender and priorities (version 2)
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5]
Male gender −0.001
(0.029)
0.182
(0.031)
∗∗∗
−0.147
(0.033)
∗∗∗
−0.012
(0.028)
−0.268
(0.035)
∗∗∗
No formal educ1 0.112
(0.047)
∗∗ 0.027
(0.055)
0.111
(0.062)
∗
−0.105
(0.046)
∗∗
−0.123
(0.054)
∗∗
educ2 0.214
(0.045)
∗∗∗
−0.018
(0.051)
0.254
(0.058)
∗∗∗
−0.127
(0.044)
∗∗∗
−0.334
(0.053)
∗∗∗
educ3 0.358
(0.057)
∗∗∗
−0.034
(0.063)
0.433
(0.067)
∗∗∗
−0.273
(0.055)
∗∗∗
−0.516
(0.071)
∗∗∗
educ4 0.520
(0.064)
∗∗∗
−0.167
(0.068)
∗∗ 0.608
(0.071)
∗∗∗
−0.374
(0.061)
∗∗∗
−0.577
(0.082)
∗∗∗
Constant −0.256
(0.156)
1.147
(0.133)
∗∗∗
−1.615
(0.151)
∗∗∗ 0.284
(0.127)
∗∗
−0.941
(0.161)
∗∗∗
LL -15334 -13431 -12553 -16257 -11157
BIC 30951 27145 25389 32797 22597
Obs 24,926 24,926 24,926 24,926 24,926
Nb countries 20 20 20 20 20
The table reports coefficients from the logit estimation, the dependent variables are policy priorities.
To measure policy priorities we use the second codification defined in section 3.2. The dependent
variable is Macroeconomics in [1] , Social-discrimination in [2], Politics-war in [3], Infrastructure in [4]
and Agriculture in [5]. All the regressors that are in column 6 of table 3 have been included but not
reported. Standard errors are in parenthesis. *** significant at 1%, ** significant at 5%, * significant at
10%.
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Table A 5: Support for Democracy dropping countries
A B
Country gender gender HDI*gender PR*gender
Benin -0.190 -0.935*** 0.936*** 0.0458*
Botswana 0.000519 -0.933*** 0.876** 0.0522**
Burkina -0.696*** -0.829*** 0.732** 0.0473**
Cape Verde -0.0454 -0.904*** 0.836** 0.0506**
Ghana -0.259 -0.926*** 0.840** 0.0557**
Kenya -0.304* -0.932*** 0.908*** 0.0497**
Lesotho -0.119 -0.920*** 0.890** 0.0477**
Liberia -0.226 -0.967*** 0.998*** 0.0468**
Madagascar -0.263* -0.943*** 0.946*** 0.0471**
Malawi -0.863*** -0.834*** 0.734** 0.0495**
Mali -0.473*** -0.908*** 0.794** 0.0559**
Mozambique -0.175 -1.018*** 1.167*** 0.0404*
Namibia 0.112 -0.819*** 0.586 0.0533**
Nigeria -0.423*** -0.908*** 0.871** 0.0499**
Senegal -0.629*** -0.925*** 0.714** 0.0704***
South Africa -0.0883 -0.918*** 0.859** 0.0528**
Tanzania -0.286* -0.925*** 0.889** 0.0495**
Uganda -0.279** -0.960*** 0.806** 0.0624**
Zambia -0.0143 -0.946*** 0.924*** 0.0485**
Zimbabwe -0.218 -1.046*** 0.831** 0.0766***
The coefficients reported on each line are those obtained by dropping the country on that line.
*** significant at 1%, ** significant at 5%, * significant at 10%.
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